







&dquo;Conflict management&dquo; usually refers to purposeful control of
the overt behavior of parties to a conflict, such that their
interactions remain within certain qualitative and quantitative
limits. The most frequently specified limits imply the preven-
tion or minimization of violence, but this is not essential to the
defintion. Control of the psychological states of the parties
(e.g., prevention or minimization of hostility) is often implied,
but this is usually seen as one means of controlling behavior,
rather than as the main goal. By definition, then, successful
conflict management depends on successful control of behavior.
Efforts to control behavior are virtually universal, since most
human individuals and groups make frequent or continued
efforts to control both their own behavior and the behavior of
others. A large proportion of these efforts occurs in or generates
conflict situations, and is made by the parties to the conflict as
well as by &dquo;interested&dquo; third parties. It is therefore logically
possible for anyone, regardless of his or her role in a particular
conflict, to engage in efforts at conflict management.
Unless the &dquo;manager&dquo; is merely lucky, successful behavior
control would seem to depend on two things: knowledge of the
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essential determinants of behavior, and power to mainpulate
those determinants. Repeated efforts to control behavior will be
successful to the extent that the crucial behavior-determining
factors have been correctly identified, and in proportion to the
technical feasibility of manipulating those factors in the desired
direction. This implies that the long-run reliability of control is
a joint (multiplicative) function of knowledge and power:
knowledge without power cannot yield control, and power
without knowledge can yield control only by accident.
Since there are wide variations among would-be conflict
managers in their degree of success, it must be assumed that
good luck, knowledge, and power are unevenly distributed, and
that those who are repeatedly more successful than others have
a larger share of knowledge and power relevant to the behaviors
they try to control. In the world of common sense and
nonscientific social thought, it is widely held that practical
personal experience and favored social position tend to produce
higher levels of relevant knowledge and power, and therefore
greater success at behavior control and conflict management. In
the world of social science, it is widely held that empirically
tested formal theories of behavior produce more reliable and
communicable knowledge than does personal experience. Those
who adopt this position assume that systematic application of
such theories will (at least in the long run) yield the most
reliably successful conflict management approaches.
This does not imply that all behavior theories are equally
useful, since they vary widely in empirical adequacy, generality,
and other attributes. Nevertheless, any theory which purports
to explain or predict behavior has definite implications for
behavior control, since it points to the factors which determine
behavior and which therefore would have to be manipulated if
one wished to control behavior (assuming the truth of the
theory). Different theories have different implications because
they conceptualize behavior differently or because they point
to different determining factors, or both. Presumably, the
.theory of model with the greatest empirical validity and the
greatest generality will lead to the greatest success in behavior
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control and conflict management. However, it may not be
possible to tell which theory has the greatest empirical validity
unless it is actually tested through specific control efforts. This
suggests that an examination of their behavior-control and
conflict-management implications may be useful even before
empirical research has produced a definitive choice among
competing theories and models of behavior.
The following discussion is restricted to an analysis of the
conflict management strategies implied by expected-utility
models such as that proposed by Markus and Tanter in this
issue’s present symposium. Among contemporary theoretical
approaches to the analysis of social conflict, perhaps the most
widely used are those subsumed under the heading of decision
theory, including both statisitcal decision theory (game theory,
utility theory, and the like) and allied nonmathematical theories
of decision-making. A key concept in the whole panorama of
decision theory is the notion of expected utility, defined as the
product of the utility of an event times its probability of
occurrence. This concept (and its variants such as expected
value and subjective expected utility) has been used in many
fields for a long time (Miller, 1971) both in normative models
of decision-making and in descriptive models which are in-
tended to predict how people will actually behave, usually on
the assumption that persons act so as to maximize expected
utility. Without delving into the enormous technical literature
in this field, the present paper will briefly demonstrate the
range and complexity of the alternative strategies of behavior
control implied by such models and will point out some of the
difficulties and limitations that are likely to be encountered in
any attempt to apply them in concrete conflict situations.
GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF EXPECTED UTILITY MODELS
Expected utility (EU) usually refers to a (subjective) utility
of an event weighted by its objective probability of occurrence,
while subjective expected utility (SEU) merely substitutes a
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subjective (perceived) probability of occurrence in the same
formula. The subjective expected utility of an outcome is thus
defined as
where p(o) is the perceived (subjective) probability that the
given outcome will occur and Uo is the (subjective) utility of
that outcome to the perceiver. Since p(o) can range from 0 to 1,
the range of possible values for SEUo is the same as that for uo,
which usually is assumed to vary from some negative value
through zero to some positive value, dependeing on the scale
one uses for measuring utilities. The above formula can be used
in comparing preferences among possible outcomes, but, strictly
speaking, it cannot be applied to actions unless one first
considers the possible instrumentality of the action in bringing
about the outcome. This can be done by defining the subjective
expected utility of an action as
where p(ola) is the subjective conditional probability that the
outcome will follow if the action occurs. In the simplest case,
the subjective expected utility of an action is an attitude-like
construct, representing the product of a cognitive orientation,
p(ola), and an evaluative orientation, uo, toward a possible
outcome of that action.
Most formulas for SEUa are actually more complex than this,
since they assume that any given action may lead to more than
one outcome simulataneously. This leads to the postulation of
several distinct utility terms, each with its own probability
weight, and these component expected utilities are then
summed to arrive at a total SEU. Thus,
[841]
where n is the number of separate outcomes which may
simultaneously follow from the action. Although it is not
necessary, some models further partition the outcomes into
those with net positive utilities (benefits) and net negative
utilities (costs), so that SEU becomes the algebraic sum of
subjective expected benefits (SEB) and subjective expected
costs (SEC). Thus,
where n is the number of distinct beneficial outcomes (b),
where m is the number of distinct costly outcomes (c), where
Ub is the (positive) utility of a beneficial outcome, and where Uc
is the (negative) utility of a costly outcome. Further partition-
ing of outcomes and utilities into specified classes is often done,
but this is usually tied closely to specific empirical applications
and can be ignored for the moment.
For explaining or predicting behavior, most SEU models
posit a choice (not necessarily conscious or explicit) among two
or more actions, types of action, or other distinct behavioral
alternatives. Assuming that persons prefer to maximize ex-
pected benefits or to minimize expected costs, such models
predict that (other things being equal) the alternative with the
highest SEU will be chosen. In other words, they predict
behavioral choice from a comparison among the actor’s overall
psychological orientations toward each of the alternatives.
Some models go a step further, adding variables other than SEU
in order to take into account other determinants of behavior;
that is, they specify some of the &dquo;other things&dquo; that must
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remain equal if behavior is to be reliably predicted from the
utility maximization principle. The complexity of such models,
and consequently the amount of information needed if one is to
use them for predicting behavior in concrete situations, thus
varies widely, dependeing on the number of behavioral alterna-
tives which must be considered, the complexity of the formula
for SEU, and the number of other behavior determinants which
are incorporated in the model.
VIOLENCE PREVENTION AS AN EXAMPLE OF
CONFLICT MANAGEMENT
In order to illustrate the conflict management implications of
expected utility models, it will be useful to consider a particular
conflict management problem. Virtually any imaginable type of
behavior can be considered &dquo;conflict behavior,&dquo; at least under
certain circumstances, and its prevention, minimization, or
other regulation can be taken as a goal of conflict management.
Nevertheless, certain forms of behavior are much more likely
than others to be involved in conflict situations, and it is on
these that conflict management efforts are usually concen-
trated. Perhaps the most pervasive goal of conflict managers is
to prevent the more violent and destructive forms of conflict
behavior, and to maximize the use of nonviolent modes of
struggle. This goal is clearly evident, for example, in the
following passage:
Man has always had recource to violence. Sometimes this recourse
was a mere crime and does not interest us here. But at other times
violence was the means resorted to by him who had previously
exhausted all others in defense of the rights of justice which he
thought he possessed.... This form of violence is none other than
reason exasperated. Force was, in fact the ultima ratio. Rather
stupidly it has been the custom to take ironically this experession
which clearly indicates the previous submission of force to methods
of reason. Civilization is nothing else than the attempt to reduce
force to being the ultima ratio. We are now beginning to realize this
with startling clearness because ’direct action’ consists in inverting
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the order and proclaiming violence as the prima ratio or strictly as
the unica ratio [Ortega y Gasset, 1932: 82].
This comment epitomizes the widely held view (among social
scientists) that instrumental violence is the last resort in most
conflicts. It is usually assumed that other means of attaining
goals &dquo;in the face of human opposition&dquo; are tried first, and,
only when they fail or at least when it appears that they are
destined to fail within acceptable time limits, violent methods
of overcoming the resistance of opponents are chosen. Ortega
restricts this model of the priorities to revolutionary political
struggles, but there is no reason to do so, since the problem of
defending one’s &dquo;rights of justice&dquo; can easily arise in relations
with another person (especially in situations involving authority
relations) just as well as in relations with a government (Simmel,
1955; Dahrendorf, 1959). Furthermore, many violent acts
defined as &dquo;crimes&dquo; are conceptually quite similar to political
violence, but on a smaller scale; they take place in situations
where at least one party has decided that other methods of goal
attainment are less satisfactory.
To view violence as the last resort is to assume that in the
early stages of a conflict process, nonviolent methods are
preferred by the parties, and that only during the conflict
process does their preference for violence become greater. This
implies that a process of escalation takes place during the course
of the conflict. The problem for the conflict manager thus
becomes that of preventing escalation-i.e., of maintaining the
conditions under which the parties will continue to prefer
nonviolent methods of struggle.
FORMAL EXPLICATION OF VIOLENCE PREVENTION STRATEGIES
Defined this way, the problem is easily restated in terms of
the expected utility models outlined earlier. To take the
simplest case, one may distinguish between violent (v) and
nonviolent (nv) actions. According to the SEU maximization
principle, the general condition for preventing violence is
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Other things being equal, anything that one can do to maintain
that inequality for the parties in question will presumably
achieve the conflict manager’s goal.
If one assumes the escalation process referred to above, it
follows that during the course of a conflict there is a tendency
for SEUV to increase, or for SEU&dquo;&dquo; to decrease, or both. Either
tendency, if unchecked, will eventually reverse the inequality
and lead to violence. The conflict manager thus has two main
strategies for preventing violence, which can be used either
separately or together. The first aims at lowering or at least
preventing further increase in SEUV, while the second aims at
raising or at least preventing further decrease in SEUnv-
Substrategies under each of these can be defined as efforts to
manipulate the various components of SEU, the details of
which will depend on the particular equations in the model
adopted by the conflict manager.
For example, if one adopts the model given above in
equation 4, the general condition for preventing violence
becomes
Two main substrategies are then implied for each of the main
strategies. In order to raise, lower, or hold constant the SEU of
any given action, it is necessary to manipulate or control either
the expected benefits or the expected costs of that action, or
both. Thus, to lower the SEUV, one might either lower the
expected benefits (SEBV) or raise the expected costs (SEC,) of
violence, or both; conversely, to raise the SEUnv v one must
either raise the expected benefits (SEBnv) or lower the
expected costs (SEC&dquo;,, ) of nonviolence, or both. The require-
ments are parallel if one is merely trying to maintain an existing
SEUV against its conflict-induced tendency to increase or to
maintain an existing SEUnv against its conflict-induced tend-
ency to decrease.
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If one then substitutes the formulas for SEB and SEC as
given in equations 4a and 4b, the condition for preventing
violence becomes
This generates two further possibilities within each substrategy.
The subjective expected benefits or costs of an action are
defined as the algebraic sums of the products obtained by
multiplying the magnitude (perceived utility, Ub or u~ ) of each
identifiable positive or negative consequence of that action
(perceived benefits or costs) by the perceived probability that
the given action will lead to that consequence. To increase the
magnitude of a given product, one may either raise the
magnitude of the utility term or raise its associated subjective
probability, or both. Conversely, to decrease the magnitude of a
given product, one may lower either the utility or the
probability, or both. The requirements are parallel if one wishes
to hold SEB or SEC constant against their autonomous or
conflict-induced tendencies to change.
The conflict management strategies implied by this formula-
tion can thus be summarized as a series of alternative means by
which, throughout the course of a given conflict, the parties can
be kept in the state of preferring nonviolent methods of struggle
over violent t methods. Eight classes of logically manipulable
variables have been postulated, each of which defines a strategic
intervention point. To keep the SEUV lower than the SEU~,,,
the manager may try any or all of the following:
I. To decrease (or prevent the increase of) SEUV
A. Decrease (or prevent the increase of) SEB,, by either
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1. lowering or holding constant the perceived benefits of
violence, or
2. lowering or holding constant the subjective probabilities of
those benefits;
B. Increase (or prevent the decrease of) SECv, by either
1. raising or holding constant the perceived costs of violence, or
2. raising or holding constant the subjective probability of those
costs.
II. To increase (or prevent the decrease of) SEUnv
A. Increase (or prevent the decrease of) SEBnv, by either
1. raising or holding constant the perceived benefits of
nonviolence, or
2. raising or holding constant the subjective probability of those
benefits;
B. Decrease (or prevent the increase of) SECnv, by either
1. lowering or holding constant the perceived costs of non-
violence, or
2. lowering or holding constant the subjective probability of
those costs.
Within these eight specific strategies (it-1, IA-2, ..., IIB-2),
numerous additional subtypes could be generated by making
further distinctions among specific classes of benefits and costs.
For example, one could subdivide benefits and costs into three
main categoreis: (a) the intrinsic rewards and punishments
involved in performing a given action; (b) the gains or losses
that result from a given action that are directly related to the
goals or values at issue in the conflict; and (c) the secondary
gains or losses which are not directly related to the issues but
which may be regarded as positive or negative side effects of the
particular action. But this is only one of many ways that
additional management strategies could be defined, given the
various ways in which expected utility models can be further
elaborated. At this point, examination of these other logical
possibilities is not essential, so long as one keeps in mind that
the eight strategies discussed here by no means exhaust the
topic of conflict management, or even that of violence
prevention in the limited case postulated here. For present
purposes, it will be more useful to explore the possible
empirical and practical meanings of these few abstract categories.
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EMPIRICAL INTERPRETATION
In attempting to bring the above strategies into some sort of
reasonable contact with empirical social reality, one may
interpret them either at a very general level or in terms of
specific cases. The general level seems more appropriate here,
since these strategies are potentially relevant to a wide variety
of concrete conflict situations. However, some specific cases
will be cited in order to illustrate certain general points. It must
be remembered, as mentioned earlier, that attempts to minimize
or prevent violence may be made either by the parties
themselves or by third parties, such as relatives, friends,
neighbors, professional counselors or mediators, social service
agencies, or private and governmental agencies of all kinds.
Furthermore, while any of these potential conflict managers
may in principle use any of the strategies discussed here,
selective constraints may be imposed by the specific character-
istics of concrete conflict situations, and by the resources
available to particular managers.
The problem of manipulating the pertinent cognitive and
evaluative orientations of real persons or groups is enormously
complex and does not lend itself to any simple social
technology. What Harold Lasswell (1931) said of conflict in
general is also true of conflict management-i.e., that it may
involve use of the whole range of available instrumentalities for
social control, from simple, noncoercive verbal means through
the most coercive manipulations of rewards, punishments, or
environmental parameters. Indeed, much that goes under the
heading of social control is in fact conflict management, and
although it is not usually conceived in expected utility terms,
there are nevertheless many familiar methods of social control
or social influence which might be employed in the various
strategies of violence prevention outlined above.
MINIMIZING THE ATTRACTIVENESS OF VIOLENCE
Strategy I-A focuses on lowering or minimizing the expected
benefits of violence. This bears directly on a central considera-
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tion in the choice between violent and nonviolent methods-
their relative instrumentality for goal attainment in conflict
situations. The most common argument in favor of violence is
its greater effectiveness for overcoming, circumventing, or
otherwise neutralizing the opponent so that one may attain
one’s goal (or at least some acceptable compromise). Strictly
speaking, such arguments focus on the subjective probability
terms-formally, they say that p(blv)> p(bpv)-since to say
that an action is more effective is to say that it is more likely to
lead to a specific desired outcome. An attempt to counter this
perception would thus fall more precisely under strategy IA-2.
Even without the exhaustion of nonviolent alternatives
implied by the escalation process, there are often strong
cognitive supports for the belief that violence is quite effective.
In many situations, violence can readily eliminate the opponent,
reduce his capability of pursuing his goals or of interfering with
one’s own, or reduce his willingness to continue active
opposition. It is therefore difficult in these situations for a
conflict manager to counteract the belief in the efficacy of
violence. However, such situations are not universal, and
violence can sometimes be seen as ineffective. There are many
kinds of issues in conflict situations, especially those having to
do with the relations between the parties, where some uses of
violence automatically preclude goal attainment. The obvious
example is that of eliminating the opponent: if one wishes to
establish a specific relationship with a reluctant partner (e.g.,
marriage, servitude, and the like), murdering the partner will
not help. In such situations, where violence is obviously
self-defeating, there is strong cognitive support for the belief in
its ineffectiveness.
The crucial task for the conflict manager is to lower the
perceived effectiveness of violence (strategy IA-2) where the
parties have some reason to believe that it would succeed. One
way to do this would be to show the violence-prone party that
it has overestimated its own strength (or underestimated the
strength of the opponent), so that engaging in a fight would be
fruitless. Advice to small minorities or to much weaker parties
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in general often seems to have this aim, as in the frequently
heard countermilitant argument that the black population in
the United States is so overwhelmingly outnumbered by the
white population that it could never achieve its aims through
insurrection. Another approach would be to set up new
defenses that are more impervious to violent attack and show
the violence-prone party that these defenses are adequate to
render violent action ineffective. Fortresses, walls, and security
systems of many kinds have the aim of rendering attacks less
effective and may be veridically perceived as making futile
certain forms of violence that might otherwise be chosen. A
third approach would be to create a situation in which the use
of violence automatically reduces or eliminates any chance of
attaining the goal. Many rules of competitive sports which
penalize or disqualify one for certain acts of violence against
one’s opponent seem to have this character, as do rules
disqualifying one for insurance benefits if one commits arson or
murder.
It is also possible to reduce the expected benefits of violence
by lowering or minimizing the utility term, Ub (strategy IA-1 ).
One way to do this is to show that violence would partly
destroy the goal object, thus necessarily reducing its value even
though ensuring its attainment. For example, one might argue
that a violent struggle could not be kept within bounds, so that
desired property might be damaged unintentionally in the
process of wresting it from the opponent. Another approach,
for situations in which the goal involves some sort of behavioral
compliance by the opponents, is to show that victory through
violence would yield less-satisfactory performance than antici-
pated. For example, slave-owners, supervisors, educators, jailors,
and other captors inclined to use corporal punishment to
stimulate performance are often advised that such techniques,
while leading to overt compliance, actually produce a decre-
ment in performance, especially as compared with other
available techniques.
While the above strategies may be regarded as forms of
deterence, that term is usually reserved for strategy IB, which
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focuses on raising or maximizing the expected costs of violence.
The primary means of cost-oriented deterrence is through
threats of retaliation or punishment, and it is widely used by
parties to a conflict against their opponents. It is also widely
used by third parties in international situations (Russett, 1963;
Fink, 1965; Dowty, 1972), in a wide range of governmental
control efforts such as those embodied in the criminal code, and
in many other situations.
One may readily identify strategy IB-1 (raising the perceived
costs of violence, uc) with explicit efforts to manipulate the
magnitude of the threatened punishment or retaliation. Similar-
ly, strategy IB-2 (raising the perceived likelihood of incurring
those costs) is recognizable in efforts to increase the credibility
of a deterrent threat, which involve manipulation of the
probability term, p(clv). The popularity of cost-oriented deter-
rence among conflict managers is reflected in the vast literature
about it, and the ease of identifying it with these formally
defined strategies is reflected in the frequent use of expected-
utility formulations by students of deterrence.
The popularity of deterrent threats is linked to the wide-
spread belief in the efficacy of violence. In strategy IB-2, the
conflict manager is in a position analogous to that of any
violence-prone party in a conflict. But there are deterrents to
the use of deterrence which may inhibit conflict managers from
adopting it. First, there is something paradoxical about using
the threat of violence (and occasional actual violence to give the
threat credibility) in order to deter violence. To the extent that
this is effective in the hands of a third party (i.e., the state or
other social control agencies), it will necessarily work against
lowering the perceived effectiveness of violence (strategy IA-2)
in the conflict the manager is trying to control. So long as the
threat of violence is perceived to work in some situations when
used by some people, this perception will be generalized and
applied to other situations and other people. Second, deterrence
may be ineffective in the long run because it is difficult to
justify strong deterrent threats against nonviolent actions which
may lead to violence. For example, the criminal code is uneven
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in this respect because, while it may attempt to deter the use of
some nonviolent verbal means such as blackmail and slander, it
does little (except in rare instances) to deter the use of threats
of violence or of milder forms of violence such as corporal
punishment, even though these may often lead directly to
escalation in particular conflict situations. Finally, there are
built-in limitations of deterrence due to the difficulty and high
cost of making deterrent threats credible. For example, one
reason why capital punishment does not prevent murder is that
the probability that it will be used is relatively small, even in the
most repressive regimes. There is always a good chance of not
getting caught, of not getting convicted, of escaping, or of
getting a reprieve or commutation of sentence, and the task of
credibly reducing the probability of each of these outcomes is
massive. The same is true for the whole range of lesser and
nonviolent sanctions that the criminal code applies.
There are other examples of strategy IB which do not
encounter these difficulties, because they do not use threats as a
means of deterrence. Instead, they rely on warnings of
unanticipated dangers. Thus, one form of strategy IB-1 is to
heighten the violence-prone party’s awareness of the negative
side effects of using violence. This is certainly feasible in the
case of extreme violence, since there may be positive reasons for
wanting the opponent to remain alive and functioning. Elimi-
nating or seriously crippling the opponent, if it is merely a
means of preventing him from doing certain things that you do
not want him to do, has the disadvantage that it also prevents
him from doing other things that you might want him to do.
Elizabeth Converse (1968) has described this as the imprecision
of violence, which is one of the major drawbacks of at least
certain forms of violence, and perhaps also of other means of
social control. Another variant of this strategy is to heighten
awareness of the intinsic costs of violence, by showing that one
cannot use it without suffering psychological or physical
damage in the process. Admonitions about backfire effects,
such as those risked in chemical, biological, and nuclear warfare,
are a case in point.
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MAXIMIZING THE A’ITRACl1VENESS OF NONVIOLENCE
On the other side of the inequality, conflict management
focuses on the subjective expected utility of nonviolent
methods. Strategy IIA aims to raise or maximize the expected
benefits of nonviolence, while strategy IIB aims to lower or
minimize its expected costs.
Strategy IIA-2 deals with the key issue concerning nonviolent
means, namely their perceived effectiveness in goal attainment,
represented by the probability term p(blnv). This has been one
of the central problems for political and religious groups
promoting nonviolent ideologies of social action, especially
among parties who feel that they have exhausted the available
nonviolent alternatives against an intransigent enemy.
Cognitive support for belief in the ineffectiveness of non-
violent methods is often quite strong. For example, the
notorious lack of equality in the administration of justice for
the poor and for minority groups becomes widespread knowl-
edge in a variety of ways, and leads to a general discrediting of
law enforcement and jurisprudence among the chronically
defeated. Widespread dissemination of statistical evidence for
such patterns of discrimination can strengthen the perception of
the opponents’ intransigence and lead to reduced confidence in
institutionalized nonviolent methods of struggle (Tumin, 1968).
More generally, the members of a society develop stable
expectations about the likelihood of a satisfactory settlement if
they employ particular nonviolent methods or institutionalized
mechanisms of conflict resolution. These expectations, based on
accumulated experience and common knowledge, will usually
be different for different parties and between different so-
cieties. Thus it is clearly possible for certain nonviolent modes
of conflict resolution to be seen as ineffective in one group or
society but quite effective in another (Nader and Metzer, 1963).
This indicates that conflict management efforts directed at
increasing confidence in nonviolence may be feasible in some
instances.
Such efforts can be made in a variety of ways. One approach
is to expand the violence-prone party’s awareness of and
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competence in the use of nonviolent techniques, ranging from
more effective techniques of persuasion to more effective
techniques of noncooperation (boycotts, strikes, ostracism, and
the like) or more sophisticated methods of bargaining and
conflict resolution. This can be done through educational
programs, the dissemination of research findings on these
methods, actual mass demonstrations, and the like. A second
approach is to make available certain agencies or institutional-
ized mechanisms which were previously unavailable or to
upgrade the effectiveness of existing mechanisms. The spread of
new forms (e.g., ombudsman roles, third party consultation,
sensitivity training, and encounter groups) and the reform of
existing institutions (e.g., extending the vote, changing criteria
for jury composition, or reducing bureaucratic red tape) are
typical examples.
These and other approaches to increasing the perceived
effectiveness of nonviolence share a potentially self-defeating
quality, similar to the paradox of deterrent threats discussed
earlier. This strategy runs the risk that as one increases the
weaker party’s awareness of or belief in the effectiveness of
nonviolent means against the opponent, one may automatically
reduce the opponent’s belief in their effectiveness for his own
goal attainment, thus inducing the opponent to consider violent
alternatives. This results from the fact that one can hardly
improve the weaker party’s perceived chances of winning
without altering the perceive and actual power relations
between the parties. The violent response of some Southern
segregationists, once the integration forces had won their case in
court, illustrates this potential for a violent counterrevolution
following a successful nonviolent revolution.
Strategy IIA-1 avoids this paradox since it focuses on raising
or maximizing the perceived utility (Ub) of nonviolence. Since
this is parallel to strategy IA-1, one might simply apply the
examples there in reverse. However, it seems less feasible to
argue that nonviolence would somehow improve the goal object
than it does to argue that violence might damage it. The conflict
manager might have an easier time persuading the violence-
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prone party that the longer-range benefits of winning the
short-run goal nonviolently are larger than he might imagine. Or
the extra prestige accorded one who plays by the rules and
struggles honorably may be a credible inducement in many
cases.
Strategy IIB is the reverse of deterrence, since it focuses on
reducing the expected costs of nonviolence. The key problem
here is that nonviolence will be seen as costly to the extent that
it makes one vulnerable to defeat by a violent opponent. But
this aspect is already taken care of in strategy IIA, which seeks
more effective nonviolent means of struggle. There are other
costs, however, that may vary independently of the effective-
ness of nonviolence.
In strategy IIB-1, the conflict manager’s aim is to lower or
prevent an increase in the perceived costs (uc) of nonviolent
action. There are certainly many examples of nonviolent means
which, though effective, are quite expensive to employ.
Surveillance, propaganda campaigns, legal procedures, and other
techniques and mechanisms may be cheaper than violence in
some situations, but they require time and effort which may
make them prohibitively expensive in other situations or for
some parties. Finding more efficient ways of using them, or
modifying institutions so that they become chaper to use, is one
general way of reducing their perceived costs. The establishment
of streamlined procedures, as in small claims courts, is an
example. This approach may actually be an essential part of
making certain nonviolent means more widely available. An-
other approach would be to remove negative sanctions which
currently exist against some forms of nonviolence. Thus,
legitimation of forms of protest currently regarded as dishonest,
unscrupulous, unpatriotic, or illegal would effectively lower
their perceived costs. Modification of norms which regard the
preference for nonviolence as &dquo;cowardly&dquo; or &dquo;unmanly&dquo; would
also come under this approach.
Finally, strategy IIB-2 aims to reduce the subjective prob-
ability of incurring such costs, p(cpv). This implies reducing the
credibility of existing deterrents to nonviolence. One approach
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is to show that certain sanctions, though threatened, are rarely
applied. Thus, disseminating information concerning the rarity
with which certain laws are invoked, or concerning the
frequency of suspended sentences or amnesty for certain kinds
of illegal nonviolent acts, could help reduce the perceived risk
of those actions. Another approach would be to argue that
there is little chance of having to incur the whole cost of an
apparently expensive technique, because its initiation usually
induces a more rapid resolution of the conflict. For example,
one party may be persuaded to initiate a lawsuit on the
assumption that the opponent will prefer to reach a settlement
out of court rather than incur the costs of a lengthy legal battle.
ADVANTAGES AND LIMITATIONS OF
EXPECTED UTILITY MODELS
The above examples are sufficient to show that conflict
management strategies implied by expected utility models do
correspond to meaningful and socially significant empirical
phenomena. Although the examples adduced are by no means
exhaustive and may not be the best ones possible, their
selection and formulation were definitely facilitated by the
specific model presented in equations 1-7, given the particular
conflict management problem posed (violence prevention). This
indicates that such models have, at the very least, some degree
of heuristic value for practical applications.
Other indications of heuristic value are found in the analytic
advantages of the expected utility formulation. First, it provides
a parsimonious classification scheme which serves as a relatively
powerful organizing framework for thinking about diverse
empirical elements relevant to conflict management. Second, it
has sufficient precision and internal consistency to facilitate
scrutiny of the interdependence and mutual implications of the
alternatives while searching for the best procedure to use in a
particular case. Third, it provides a rational framework which is
capable of incorporating both rational and irrational elements in
behavior. Fourth, it is an &dquo;open&dquo; model in the sense that it
[856]
readily permits the proliferation of distinctions where necessary
and the recombination of elements in a variety of ways, thus
rendering it useful in many different kinds of situations. And
finally, it is capable of coherent articulation with ethical and
other considerations that must enter any attempted applica-
tions.
Despite these advantages, expected utility models have
serveral limitations which must be kept in mind in considering
their use by conflict managers. First, they clearly allow much
greater analytic precision than current levels of empirical
measurement and practical technique can fully exploit. Since
very precise measurement of the psychological states corre-
sponding to subjective probability and utility is difficult,
especially in ongoing conflict situations, application of the
models can be fruitless or counterproductive if the manager
tries to work within the close tolerances they allow in the
abstract, or if he fails to assign sufficiently large error estimates
to the empirical data. Second, expected utility models are
insufficient by themselves to suggest specific techniques of
conflict management. They must be imbedded in larger theories
or bodies of empirical knowledge which provide some purchase
on the problem of measuring and controlling the relevant
psychological states. Third, such models have blind spots
concerning psychological processes which may be of great value
in conflict management. Since they are best suited to the
analysis of psychological reactions to existing alternatives, they
run the risk of diverting attention away from psychological
processes, such as creative problem-solving, which could, if fully
exploited, eliminate much of the work for conflict managers in
the long run.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper has explored the implications of one kind of
expected utility model for one kind of conflict management
problem (violence prevention under conditions of potential
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escalation). The analysis has been conducted at relatively high
levels of abstraction and generality, and no effort has been
made to provide guidance for particular conflict managers in
particular conflict situations. It has been an exercise in heuristic
modelling and will have fulfilled its purpose if it suggests
fruitful lines of inquiry or useful modes of analysis.
Similar analyses can be performed on other expected utility
models, such as the one proposed by Markus and Tanter earlier
in this issue. These will differ in many details and will
undoubtedly lead to many examples quite different from the
ones adduced here. Comparisons among the practical implica-
tions of various expected utility models may be of great value in
identifying crucial gaps or ambiguities in the models and in
identifying crucial points of complementarity or of disagree-
ment among various conflict management approaches. Such
analyses should be expanded so as to do justice to the
voluminous literature on violence, nonviolence, and violence
prevention which has only been hinted at here. The analysis and
comparisons should then be extended to other kinds of conflict
management problems and to other classes of behavioral
models. These extensions might help identify points of articu-
lation, disagreement, and compatibility among a wider set of
theories, models, and practical approaches. A concerted effort
to confront formal models (and unformalized theories) with
their empirical and practical implications and limitations would
be of great benefit, not only to conflicting parties and conflict
managers, but also to those who are primarily interested in
advancing basic research and theory about social conflict.
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